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ABSTrAcT
objective: “Wireless technology” is the magic word in today’s era. In which, cyber-physical systems (CPS) is the booming world which binds the 
physical world and cyber world together. The CPS is also called as safety critical system because of the human life involvement. In this emerging 
technology, lots of heterogeneous sensors are involved, and each sensor will play an important role. If something goes wrong with sensor or sensor 
data, it will definitely affect the human life involved in it.
Methods: In this paper, we proposed a generic trust management framework (TRMF) for heterogeneous sensors which will detect the sensor data 
falsification (data integrity), faulty sensor reading, and packet dropping nodes (selfish nodes) through rules and rating concept.
results: The efficiency of the proposed framework is evaluated with the help of network simulator 2. The maximum numbers of untrusted nodes are 
identified in point 0.40 than multi-level trust framework for wireless sensor network and framework for packet-droppers mitigation. It is also evident 
that TRMF for CPS identifies maximum number of untrusted nodes in the detection range of 0.35 and 0.45. Therefore, 0.35 and 0.45 are considered as 
maximum and minimum threshold points for effective untrusted nodes.
conclusion: The experimentation results and comparative study shows that our TRMF will easily detected sensors which misbehave.
keywords: Cyber-physical systems, Network security, Selfish nodes, Trust management, Wireless sensor network.
InTroDucTIon
As we all know that computers or devices are connected using a 
network mainly to exchange or share the data. There are mainly two 
broad categories of network one is a wired network and another one is 
a wireless network. Wireless network is the one which is growing in a 
drastic manner. In general, the wireless network is very much prone to 
attacks. In which wireless sensor network (WSN) also prone to many 
kinds of attacks such as timing attack, the packet dropping attack, 
cryptographic attack, and data falsification attack.
Fig. 1 shows the overall structure of CPS. Suppose such kind of above 
attacks hits the cyber-physical system (CPS) where several WSNs 
are involved to perform the task. Then, it will affect the life of human 
being who involved in it. It is not at all easy to verify each sensor 
data individually in such complex environment. Many cryptographic 
solutions which deal with encryption and decryption are available. 
However, due to computation overhead, such solution will not suit in 
this case. That too, if the key sizes are more, then the computation time 
will also be more. In CPS, the sensors involved will be heterogeneous in 
nature. It will be very difficult to develop a single cryptographic system 
for different sensors.
In such environment developing, a trust management framework 
(TRMF) will be a feasible solution. Trust management in information 
technology will be used for making decisions. The output of trust 
management will be 1 or 0. If the value is 1 then the corresponding entity 
can be trusted or else it will not be trusted. Such decisions can help 
preventing human life loss due to faulty devices or attackers. In general, 
trust will differ from application to application. In a heterogeneous 
sensor environment, developing a trust management for several 
sensors is not a preferable one. To develop a single framework for all 
kinds of sensors, few common properties of sensors are examined. 





By checking these properties, we can easily detect whether an attack 
happened or not, in which each parameter will be assigned a priority. 
The highest priority goes to data integrity and lowest priority goes to 
turn around time. Suppose if the data integrity check fails no need to 
proceed further because it has the highest priority, immediately the 
trust value will become 0. At the same time, if the turnaround time went 
wrong or if there is any variation by checking further such as packet 
dropping behavior, data integrity check, and cryptographic property, 
we can determine whether it has been attacked by the attacker because 
of the lowest priority like in Fig. 2
system model
In this section, various parameters for trust management such as 
turnaround time, packet dropping behavior (selfish node), data 
integrity check, and cryptographic check have been analyzed and given 
a brief introduction on each property.
Turnaround time
The turnaround time is the total amount of time a packet takes to reach 
the destination. If the turnaround time is above the allotted threshold 
value, then it will be considered as the attacker has modified the data 
or captured the packet.
Packet dropping behavior
Packet dropping is one of the important properties of a WSN to find 
the malicious node or the compromised node in the network. It is 
sometimes called as selfish node, which will only receive packets and 
drop the packets if it is not meant for it mainly to save its energy, where 
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with the help of sequence number the number of dropped, packets can 
be determined.
In which a counter variable will be initiated, whenever there is a drop in 
packets (i.e.) missing sequence number the counter will be incremented. 
Suppose if the counter, variable goes beyond the threshold value. Then, 
such node will be considered as untrustworthy node. The threshold 
value depends on the average number of packets transmitted. Below 
formula gives the percentage of packet dropped at a node.
% of dropped packets = 
No. of packets transmitted
Total No. of packets received
´100  (1)
Data integrity check
Integrity check has been considered as an important property because 
the data are collected from an open environment and sometimes 
there will be a need to travel for a longer distance. In such case, there 
is a chance for the attacker to capture the packet and modifying. This 
integrity check property will verify whether the data have been falsified 
or not with the help of watermarking technique. Sometimes this kind of 
falsifying the data is called as deception attack. In watermarking, there 
are three steps: First watermarking generation, second embedding the 
generated watermark along with the data, and third watermarking 
verification. In watermarking generation, a separate code will be 
generated from the data itself. Usually, it is called the hashed code. 
This data along with the hashed code will be encrypted later in 
cryptographic technique to overcome the problem of tampering. Since 
this watermarking technique has this much computation part, it is not 
at all preferable for the sensor nodes.
Initially, data will be collected from sensors, which will be fed into 
the trust management system. The trust management system will not 
bother about the type of sensor data because the trust management 
will work only with the common properties of sensors such as the 
turnaround time, packet dropping behavior, integrity check, and 
cryptographic property.
cryptographic check
Asymmetric key algorithms usually suited for real world usage: The 
secret key does not need to be shared; the risk of getting the key is very 
smaller. In an asymmetric key algorithm, each user has to keep only 
one secret key and a collection of public keys. In symmetric keys, every 
pair of users’ needs to have their own shared secret key which will be 
used for later transactions. The well-known asymmetric algorithms 
are	relatively	slow	algorithm	(RSA),	digital	signature	algorithm	(DSA),	
and ElGamal. In general, asymmetric algorithms are much slower than 
symmetric algorithms. Therefore, the combination of both symmetric 
and asymmetric is being used in many applications. Asymmetric keys 
are commonly used for authentication purpose, and further one or 
more symmetric keys are generated and exchanged with the help of 
asymmetric encryption.
In this way, the above algorithms can be used. Some examples of this 
type	 are	 the	 IDEA/RSA	 combination	 of	 PGP2	 or	 the	BLOWFISH/DSA	
used in GnuPG. In this type, the RSA is commonly used for encryption 
purpose which has to be checked for each incoming packets. If the 
check is not successful, then the packet will be considered as modified 
by the attacker. Since cryptographic check has been kept as a third level 
priority (i.e.) third level of the check to calculate the trust value.
Adversary model
In this section, we examine the various scenarios of the adversary 
model.	 Definitely	 the	 time	 took	 to	 check	 all	 these	 properties	will	 be	
more and will be an overhead. It can be overcome by checking only the 
abnormal data packets alone.
Case 1: If suppose the attacker has taken the abnormal data packet and 
changed it as the normal one, it can be easily identified with the help of 
turnaround time and cryptographic verification corresponding measure 
like request for resend can be published.
Case 2: If the attacker compromised any sensor node, it can be identified 
by calculating the dropped packets property.
Case 3: If suppose the attacker captured the packet and modified, with 
the help of watermarking verification (integrity check) it can be easily 
identified.
related WorK
From the past decade, several trust management system has been 
contributed to deal with the security of CPS. However, none of the 
approaches has developed a TRMF for heterogeneous sensors. An 
introduction on an agent-based trust management in ad-hoc and 
sensor network has been made mainly to manage the trust and 
reputation with minimal overhead in terms of time delay and extra 
messages. However, the authors have not provided any contribution 
toward heterogeneous sensors [1]. A collaborative reputation 
framework has been introduced, in which Watchdog mechanism is 
used as a detection component and also three approaches have been 
followed	 like	 subjective,	 indirect	 and	 functional	 reputation	 [2,3]. 
A reputation mechanism for identifying malicious nodes using opinion 
metric has been proposed, in which trust and confidence limit has 
been estimated by statistical values obtained from the reliable delivery 
of packets [4]. A novel multiple-level TRMF has been proposed in 
which there are three trust levels used to implement a trustworthy 
relationship	between	nodes.	 The	 authors	used	 a	 subjective	 trust,	 an	
objective	trust,	and	the	third	one	is	recommended	trust	method	to	get	
trustable impression from strange nodes [5].
A survey on various trust models has been presented, in which the 
authors analyzed many trust models such as malicious attacker 
detection, safe and secure routing, safe and secure data aggregation, 
secure localization, and safe node selection. Furthermore, the author 
classifies different attacks against the trust models and concluded 
Fig. 1: overall Structure of cyber-physical system
Fig. 2: Trust management framework for cyber physical systems
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like whether the trust models which already exist can resist these 
attacks or not [6,7]. An analysis has been made for four different 
decentralized and distributed trust management schemes and 
proposed a robust M-Trust for mobile P2P networks. The results 
produced by them possess the outstanding performance in terms 
of speed, reliability, accuracy, and detection rate [8]. The gaps have 
been identified and proposed research directions in CPS intrusion 
detection system based on two terms: First, by detection technique 
and secondly, through audit material. Furthermore, the authors 
summarize advantages and disadvantages of both dimensions 
along with future research area [9]. A semantic model for general 
information flow analysis in CPS has been proposed and provided 
an approach to perform the analysis, in terms of trace-based and 
automated analysis by algebra specification. The authors have taken 
two models namely gas pipeline and a smart electric power grid 
system to prove those two preserve confidentiality [10].
A review has been made on some research activities in WSN, in terms 
of networking issues, coverage and deployment problem. The authors 
demonstrated how the CPS applications make use of the physical 
information collected by a WSN to provide a connection between real 
and cyberspace [11]. A study on trust and reputation management 
system in wireless communication has been made. The authors have 
viewed the trust models in two different categories a. Individual level 
trust Model b. System level trust model, in which incentives will be 
given to the node to work in ways that enhance the overall system 
performance. While discussing on the reputation, the authors have 
mentioned that the neighbor’s information will always not be true. It 
should be taken care in future research [12,13]. A fully distributed trust-
based routing framework integrated with optimized link state routing 
has been proposed. This paper based on Eigen Trust mechanism to 
identify the packet droppers. Each nodes trust will be transformed 
into suitable weights provided as input to the optimized link state 
routing [14].
ProPosed WorK
As we all know that the main work of sensors is to sense the environment 
and send the collected/gathered data to the nearby relay nodes to 
deliver it to the sink. And also, if it is a sensor node, it will process the 
data and send it to the sink. Later, the data will be a handover to the 
controller to make decisions like whether to activate the actuator or 
not. But especially in CPS valuable human being life will get involved. 
If there is any deviation in the sensed data is not considered properly, 
it will affect the human life. In such case, trust management plays an 
important role. In CPS, heterogeneous sensors are involved which 
will be controlled by distributed controllers to activate the actuators. 
The role of trust management is to check whether the sensor data can 
be trusted or not. In order to do so, the node has to undergo various 
types of checks like time taken to send and receive data are within the 
limit, whether the sensor node is forwarding the data properly or not, 
also whether it has followed all cryptographic rule or not, whether the 
data has modified in between or not. All these checks are common to 
all heterogeneous sensor nodes. Furthermore, various priority levels 
are given to each of the checks to reduce the time taken for checking. 
The highest priority goes to the data integrity and lowest goes to turn 
around time. Each check will have a threshold value, in which if suppose 
a sensor data is undergoing various checks, a scaling factor of 10 will be 
there like in Fig. 3. Furthermore, the scaling factor will be divided into 
4 as 2.5 each.
Here, the threshold value will fall at the rate of 5 out of 10. If the scaling 
value falls within value 5, then the sensor cannot be trusted, it will be 
considered as it has been compromised by an attacker. Else the sensor 
node can be trusted. Below the framework for trust management 
system has been given which starts initially from sensing the data and 
will pass towards integrity check till turnaround time the result of it 
will be given to the controller. Fig. 4 shows the flow of data from sensor 
to controller to make decision to be trusted or not.








TVth Trust threshold value
TF Total factor
Test Estimated trust
Algorithm (estimation trust metric)
1. For each Sensor Node SNi in Network N,
2. If SNi ϵ	Route	path	(S, SN1, SN2 …. SNn, D)
Fig. 3: Scaling factor
Fig. 4: workflow diagram
179
Special Issue (April)
 Devi and Ganesan 
untrusted node will be omitted from the routing path to prevent it from 
infection spread by the attackers in the network. The proposed framework 
will identify the untrusted node up to 80% compared to MTF-WSN and 
FPDM.	 Extensive,	 simulations,	 and	 analysis	 have	 been	 conducted	 and	
demonstrated the efficiency of the proposed scheme.
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Fig. 5: comparative chart for trust management framework-cyber 
physical systems in detecting untrusted nodes




4. Compute the estimated weight as Test=α*TV/TF
5. If (Test < Tth)
 Assign each Sensor Node SNi (Untrusted)←True, otherwise 
SNi (Untrusted)←False
6.	 End	for
7. While SNi (Untrusted)←True,
8. Call omit untrusted node (SNi)
9.	 End	while
10. End





2. For every route in the network







To simulate the mentioned algorithm to identify the untrusted node, 
the suitable simulation parameters are identified and tabulated in 
Table 1. The efficiency of the proposed framework is evaluated with the 
help of network simulator 2 (NS-2.35). Fig. 5 shows that the maximum 
numbers of untrusted nodes are identified in point 0.40 than multi-
level trust framework for WSN (MTF-WSN) and framework for packet-
droppers	mitigation	(FPDM).	It	is	also	evident	that	TRMF-CPS	identifies	
maximum number of untrusted nodes in the detection range of 0.35 
and 0.45. Therefore, 0.35 and 0.45 are considered as maximum and 
minimum threshold points for effective untrusted nodes.
ConClusion
In this paper, we have presented a generic TRMF for heterogeneous 
sensors for finding the untrusted node from the network. Further, the 
Table 1: Simulation parameters
Parameter Value
Radio propagation model Propagation/two-way ground
Network interface type Phy/Wireless phy
Mac type Mac/802_11
Interface queue type (IFQ) Queue/Droptail/Priqueue
Channel Wireless channel
Link layer type LL
Initial energy 3.24 Joules
Antenna model Antenna/Omni	antenna
Max packet In IFQ 50
Number of mobile nodes 10
Routing protocol AODV
X	Dimension	of	topography 600
Y	Dimension	of	topography 600
